Tuesday, 6 January 2009
Moved to http://www.populardelusions.typepad.com/
This time it's different, even though it isn't
- Inappropriately accomodative monetary policy. The gold rush of 1849-1856 leading to crash of 1857, reparations from the Franco-Prussian War in the early 1870s causing the German crisis of 1873; the Fed inflating in 1927 for international reasons leading to 1929; Japan easing to offsett the yeb appreciation in late 80s leading to the Nikkei crash of 1989, Greenspan cutting rates during the Asian crisis of 1997 leading to the tech bust of 2001;
- Industrial innovation involving some new "change the world" type of technology. Canals in late 18th century UK, railroads during various 19th century manias in the US, autos and radio in the 20s, internet in the 90s.
- Endogenous financial innovation. The joint stock company during the South Sea Bubble, Trust companies in the run up to 1907, Investment Trusts in the run up to 1929;
- Change in regulations US Banking Acts of 1863/1864 for the panic of 1873, Federal Reserve act 1913 leading to the Florida Land bubble of 1924 and arguably even the crash of 1929.
Monday, 5 January 2009
Reflating the ponzi
Friday, 24 October 2008
Slowing the pace of the blogs ...
Friday, 10 October 2008
The illusion of control, shattered
"It feels that the only thing preventing all out collapse at the moment is the prospect of some sort rate cut. Soon even that prospect will be exhausted and one feels there will then be nothing holding up the market."
Wednesday, 8 October 2008
How to thaw the mkts ... Ben signals rate cuts .... Fed tries to unblock the CP market ... who will finance the deficit? ... OPEC to cut
Monday, 6 October 2008
RBA cuts rates by 1% ... events are moving too quickly ... we're watching a policy mistake
"I believe this situation is short-lived, all of us hope it is short-lived. When this situation is behind us, things will improve.''
“I can say with considerable certainty that the volatile years of boom and bust are now relegated to the past."
" ... the inflation outlook remains a risk ... energy and commodity prices are notoriously volatile, and could rise again. More importantly, there is the risk that persistently high rates of overall inflation will boost the long-run inflation expectations of businesses and households, and thus become embedded in their actual price and wage setting behavior."
"Liquidate labour, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate. Purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down... enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people."
Friday, 3 October 2008
BRICs need credit too, but less so than the US ... Europeans balk at collective action ... Hypo rescued
What was wrong with the Paulson plan ... companies starved of credit, Fed governors see lost of stimulus ... grains should be higher ... S&P value tra
Thursday, 2 October 2008
We're witnessing a huge policy mistake ...
"The aggregate stock of US debt rose from a mere 163 per cent of gross domestic product in 1980 to 346 per cent in 2007. Just two sectors of the economy were responsible for this massive rise in leverage: households, whose indebtedness jumped from 50 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 71 per cent in 2000 and 100 per cent in 2007; and the financial sector, whose indebtedness jumped from just 21 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 83 per cent in 2000 and 116 per cent in 2007 (see charts). The balance sheets of the financial sector exploded, as did the sector’s notional profitability. But leverage, alas, works both ways.
Since US net international debt was 39 per cent of GDP at the end of 2007, virtually all of this debt is an asset of another domestic entity ... when the gross debt stock is huge and economic conditions difficult, the chances that many entities are bankrupt is high. When people fear mass insolvency, lenders stop lending and the indebted stop spending. "